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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early months of the Obama administration, we are learning a 
great deal more about the previous administration‘s program of using ―en-
hanced interrogation techniques‖ on alleged al-Qaeda detainees.1  On April 
16, 2009, the new administration released to the public several memos, pre-
pared by lawyers at the Office of Legal Counsel (―OLC‖) in the administra-
tion of George W. Bush, dealing with certain legal aspects of whether 
detainees in U.S. custody could lawfully be subjected to torture.  I and 
many others have criticized the quality of legal reasoning in previously dis-
closed memos,2 and it is now conventional wisdom that something went ter-
ribly wrong with the legal advising process in the previous administration, 
at least with respect to terrorism and national security issues.  At the time of 
this writing, it remains uncertain whether an investigative report of the Jus-
tice Department‘s Office of Professional Responsibility (―OPR‖) will be re-





  Professor of Law, Cornell University. 
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  See Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, NYBOOKS.COM, Apr. 9, 2009, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22530 (link).  In a series of blog postings and print articles, Scott Hor-
ton and Andrew Sullivan detailed the origin of the euphemism ―enhanced interrogation techniques.‖  
See, e.g., Scott Horton, Defending Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, HARPERS.ORG, June 15, 2007, 
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/06/hbc-90000279 (link); Andrew Sullivan, Bush’s Torturers Fol-
low Where the Nazis Led, TIMESONLINE, Oct. 7, 2007, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/andrew_sullivan/article2602564.ece (link).   
2
  See, e.g., David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY 162 (2007); Scott Horton, Through a Mirror, Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conven-
tions to “A New Type of Warfare,” in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 136 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 
2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
67 (2005) (link); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005) (link). 
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  See Charlie Savage & Neil A. Lewis, Release of Memos Fuels Push for Inquiry into Bush’s Ter-
ror-Fighting Policies, NYTIMES.COM, Mar. 3, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/04/washington/04legal.html (link). 
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Not surprisingly, the OPR report is rumored to be highly critical of the con-
duct of the lawyers who prepared these documents.4 
Professor Hatfield concludes, in my view correctly, that the legal anal-
ysis produced by the OLC in the Bush administration was intended not as a 
good-faith attempt to determine what the law requires, but to lay the 
groundwork for American personnel to later claim reliance on the advice of 
counsel if subjected to prosecution for human-rights violations.  There are 
two strands to Professor Hatfield‘s critique of the advising process.  The 
first is positive, or empirical, and the second is normative.  The positive 
claim is that OLC lawyers such as Jay Bybee and John Yoo lost sight of 
their moral compass because as lawyers they were professionally socialized 
into a kind of moral anesthesia.5  The normative claim is that the profes-
sion‘s stance toward the immorality of client activities is passive instead of 
active, that it impermissibly commends a morality of deference to authority 
over the insistence on the moral responsibility for complicity in wrong-
doing.6   
I will have something to say about each of these points in turn, but my 
overall reaction is that Professor Hatfield‘s proposed reform is much too 
strong.  He would have lawyers act directly on the claims of their own con-
sciences rather than on the requirements of law (including tort, contract, and 
agency law norms structuring the attorney-client relationship).7  This is sur-
prising given his diagnosis of the reason for the bad lawyering in the OLC 
memos: 
 
I believe these lawyers began with the objective of justify-
ing torture.  They concluded that they were obligated to 
justify torture, and then they set out to do so.  Whoever was 
ultimately responsible for requesting the Torture Memo ap-
parently had such an objective, and the lawyers . . . ac-
cepted that position as a morally acceptable starting point. 
They made a bad moral conclusion, and I believe it drove 






  See, e.g., David Johnston & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos: Inquiry Suggests No Charges, 
NYTIMES.COM, May 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/06/us/politics/06inquire.html (link).  
5




  Id. at 8–9. 
7
  See id. at 11. 
8
  Id. at 3.  I am not quite sure how to square this passage with what is apparently a critique offered 
later in the paper of the process of intentional suspension of personal moral identity in favor of the moral 
conclusions of someone else.  Id. at 6.  If the problem with the OLC memos is that they were driven by 
the moral convictions of the lawyers, then presumably the response is to recommend suppression of or-
dinary (or first-order) moral reasoning in favor of the reasons given by someone or something else—that 
is, deference to authority. 
104:58  (2009) Deference to Clients and Obedience to Law 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/29/ 60 
An appeal to conscience would therefore entrench the problem identi-
fied by Professor Hatfield.  The last thing lawyers like Jay Bybee and John 
Yoo should be encouraged to do is to act on their sincere moral convictions 
in violation of the requirements of law.   
A more general theoretical flaw in Professor Hatfield‘s argument is 
suggested by a polemical sentence near the end of his essay: ―It should not 
be controversial to claim that the rule of law is better protected by those 
who are responsive to conscience than it is by those who intentionally dis-
regard conscience for pay and promotions.‖9  Leaving aside the ―pay and 
promotions‖ bit for a moment, it actually is quite controversial to claim that 
the rule of law, as distinct from ordinary morality, is well served by direct-
ing officials, including judges and lawyers, to refer to conscience when de-
ciding how to act.  The whole point of the rule of law is to limit the authori-
authority of actors to make all-things-considered judgments about what 
ought to be done.  Insofar as one wishes to claim that an action was lawful 
(as opposed to morally right), one is required to act on the basis of certain 
reasons, namely those validated in the appropriate way by the legal system.  
The rule of law will not be well protected by asking lawyers to act directly 
on the requirements of morality.  Morality may be better protected under 
Professor Hatfield‘s approach, but that is a different matter.   
II. THE CAUSAL STORY 
How did extremely bright, talented lawyers bungle the legal analysis so 
badly in the torture memos?  It is not as though the OLC employs hacks—
the Office has a tradition of hiring only the best and the brightest in the le-
gal profession.  Professor Hatfield argues that the involvement of elite gov-
ernment lawyers in the torture memos scandal is a failure of legal 
education.  The aspiring lawyer is trained to ―suspend [her] personal moral 
instincts and to have faith that the legal system accomplishes a greater mor-
al good by [her] accepting a truncated personal moral role . . . .‖10  But there 
is more.  More than a critique of education based on books, essays, class-
rooms, and discussion groups, this is an indictment of modernity as a 
whole.11   
Although Professor Hatfield seems to make a broad attack on an entire 
cultural tradition, I will focus here on the claim that legal education encou-
rages lawyers to inhabit a simplified moral universe.  Professor Hatfield‘s 
essay takes the view that law school tends to inculcate the attitude that the 
job of lawyers is to mold the law into whatever shape suits the client‘s in-





  Id. at 11. 
10
  Id. at 6. 
11
  After all, as Professor Hatfield says himself, ―The German intellectual heritage did not prevent 
Nazism, and enlightened French culture did not prevent the French from torturing Algerians.‖  Id. at 9. 
12
  Id. at 6.  
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a claim that authoritative legal materials underdetermine legal analysis such 
that a judgment that the law permits such-and-such will often be essentially 
a political determination.  Applied to the OLC advising case, the jurispru-
dential position is backstopped by democratic theory: if the law may sup-
port a range of reasonable interpretations, then executive branch lawyers 
must worry about acting undemocratically if they advise the President 
against doing something that he was elected to do and that is (at least argu-
ably) legally permissible.13  More broadly, Professor Hatfield describes a 
version of what has come to be known as the standard conception of legal 
ethics.14  The standard conception holds that a lawyer should be a ―neutral 
partisan‖—that is, a lawyer should defend her client‘s interests in litigation, 
press for lawful advantages in transactions, and prospectively counsel 
clients about the legality of their actions, all with reference to the interests 
of the client, not the requirements of ordinary morality.15   
Even the most vigorous defender of the standard conception must ad-
mit that there are limits.  At some point, a lawyer is no longer engaging in 
―zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law,‖ but is serving only to set 
up an advice-of-counsel defense in the event that the client is later charged 
with wrongdoing.  But the distinction between aggressive legal representa-
tion within the law and evasion of legal prohibitions can be difficult to dis-
cern in practice.  The usual explanation given for this is the indeterminacy 
of law.  Although one could cite innumerable academic statements of the 
indeterminacy claim, it also functions in the rhetoric of political officials.  
For example, after the Supreme Court ruled that American personnel over-
seas had to comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
which prohibits outrages upon human dignity, President Bush responded, 
―It‘s like—it‘s very vague.  What does that mean, ‗outrages upon human 
dignity‘?  That‘s a statement that is wide open to interpretation.‖16  Similar-
ly, Attorney General Michael Mukasey equivocated on the question of 






  This argument has been advanced by many conservative former OLC lawyers.  See, e.g., John O. 
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and His-
torical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375 (1993); Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of 
Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437 (1993) (link).  But it is not an inherently conservative position, 
and lawyers who have served in the OLC under Democratic Presidents have also noted it.  See, e.g., 
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 676 (2005); Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who 
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) (link). 
14
  For good recent accounts of the standard conception, by a defender and a critic, respectively, see 
TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER‘S 
ROLE (forthcoming 2009); David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in LUBAN, supra note 2, at 19, 
20.   
15
  Luban, supra note 14, at 20. 
16
  Transcript of Press Conference of President George W. Bush at 6 (Sept. 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/15/washington/15bush_transcript.html (link).   
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If this were an easy question, I would not be reluctant to of-
fer my views on this subject. But, with respect, I believe it 
is not an easy question.  There are some circumstances 
where current law would appear clearly to prohibit the use 
of waterboarding.  Other circumstances would present a far 
closer question.17 
 
Thus, one might state Professor Hatfield‘s critique as follows: Lawyers 
are trained to answer the question, ―What is permissible?‖ with a further 
question, ―What does my client want to do?‖18  Thus, when they run up 
against an apparent legal prohibition, they immediately put their creative 
reasoning skills to work and devise a way to work around the law.  Lawyers 
who do that sort of thing repeatedly lose any sense of obligation to interpret 
the law in good faith.  
Professor Hatfield suggests that the cause has something to do with 
failure to respect the rule of law; he says that we lawyers are socialized to 
―reason[] backwards from the conclusion we ultimately want to reach for 
our clients rather than forwards from principles we discover by ‗digging in-
to‘ the law.‖19  This explanation only pushes the causal question back one 
step.  We can assume that the OLC lawyers who participated in drafting the 
torture memos recognized this obligation in the abstract.  What factors 
would explain why they abandoned this obligation when advising on the le-
gality of torture?  The answer, I believe, is not anything as apocalyptic as 
the ―perennial evil‖ of surrendering our moral consciences to the conclu-
sions of another.20  Professor Hatfield cites to the Milgram experiments and 
David Luban‘s suggestion that people are susceptible to corruption of 
judgment resulting from the gradual transformation of a situation from am-
biguous into clearly wrongful.21  If Luban is right about this, however, the 
response is not to focus on lawyers‘ education or moral character.  A better 
approach would be to look carefully at the features of a situation that tend to 
produce corruption in judgment.22  In the case of the torture memos, the 
drafting process was set up in ways that virtually guaranteed that the legal 
analysis would be flawed.  Lawyers for the State Department, the Justice 





  Letter from Att‘y Gen. Michael B. Mukasey to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy at 2 (Jan. 29, 2008), availa-
ble at http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2008/images/01/29/letter.to.senator.leahy.pdf (link).  
18
  Cf. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
247, 259–60 (1978) (arguing that law students learn that the correct answer to, ―How do you come out 
on this case?‖ is, ―It depends on what side I‘m on‖) (link). 
19
  Hatfield, supra note 5, at 5. 
20
  Hatfield, supra note 5, at 8. 
21
  See id. at 8 n.33 (citing LUBAN, supra note 2, at 239–66).   
22
  See, e.g., John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational 
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177 (2005) (link). 
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cluded from the discussion of interrogation policy.23  The process was also 
conducted with the utmost secrecy.  These flaws ensured that dissenting 
perspectives would be excluded, thus making it more likely that the deci-
sionmaking process would be affected by psychological mechanisms such 
as the ―false consensus effect,‖ which operates to make people believe that 
others see the world in the same way that they do,24 and the pressures that 
exist in small, cohesive groups to maintain unanimity and not disrupt intra-
group solidarity.25  Some of the torture memos were also drafted relatively 
soon after the September 11 attacks, ensuring that the collapse of the Twin 
Towers, and therefore the threat of future terrorist attacks, would be the 
most highly salient, or ―available‖ frame for assessing the relative weights 
to be assigned to competing considerations such as human rights and the 
development of evidence that might be useful in preventing attacks.26   
If the causal story is best explained in terms of features of this deci-
sionmaking environment, the implication follows that if we are concerned 
about wrongdoing by lawyers, a more effective response might be to focus 
on the aspects of an institutional decisionmaking process that tend to cor-
rupt the ethical judgment of lawyers.27  The advising process in this case 
was so badly structured that it is hardly surprising that the result turned out 
to be one-sided advice that is hard to take seriously as good-faith legal 
analysis.28  Responding to concerns such as this, several former OLC law-
yers, including President Obama‘s nominee to head the Office, Dawn John-
sen, drafted a set of Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel.29  
These principles emphasize procedural norms, such as seeking the input of 
affected agencies, respecting the coordinate powers of the courts and Con-





  See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED 
INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008). 
24
  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ 
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 101–03 (1993). 
25
  IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 
2–13 (2d ed. 1982). 
26
  See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 24–25 (2008). 
27
  See Alice Woolley, Regulating Dignity, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 261 (2008) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, 
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007)). 
28
  See, e.g., Cornelia Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, and 
Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1297 (2006).  Indicia of the lack of good faith include the failure to cite and discuss 
adverse authority (such as the Steel Seizure Case in the analysis of executive power), the peculiar analo-
gies used (including the use in the August 1, 2002, Bybee memo of a Medicare reimbursement statute as 
the source for the definition of severe pain), and failure to even consider the history of treating many of 
the techniques at issue, including waterboarding, as paradigm cases of torture.  On the latter point, see 
Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 468 (2007).   
29
  See Walter E. Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 21, 2004), 
reprinted as App. 2 to Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints to 
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1603 (2007). 
30
  Id. 
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assumes, however, that we want lawyers to respect the law when advising 
clients, and not to rely on ordinary moral considerations, the demands of 
conscience, or the public interest.  The following section takes up the ques-
tion of whether this is the right way to conceive of the ethics of lawyers act-
ing in an advisory capacity. 
III. THE NORMATIVE CRITICISM 
One way to criticize both the OLC lawyers and the standard conception 
of legal ethics would be to say: The standard conception is wrong because 
it denies the moral agency of lawyers.  Lawyers should not surrender their 
conscience to their clients.  Instead, lawyers should act as morally sensitive 
people ordinarily would under like circumstances, and not blindly defer to 
the obligations of their role.  The criticism would then follow from this po-
sition that the moral wrongfulness of the torture memos depends on the 
moral wrongfulness of torture.  John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and others failed in 
ordinary moral terms because they provided assistance in accomplishing a 
grave moral wrong, namely the torture of detainees.  There are instances of 
this criticism in Professor Hatfield‘s essay, where he raises the problem of 
authority—that is, the question of whether it can ever be consistent with in-
dividual moral agency to defer to the directives of others.  The problem of 
the torture memos, he suggests, is one of lawyers‘ learned deference to the 
norms laid down by the legal system, with the tacit assumption that whatev-
er the law commands is therefore moral.31 
Elsewhere, however, Professor Hatfield gives up a great deal of the 
criticism of torture in ordinary moral terms, when he concedes that the OLC 
lawyers began with a moral conclusion that they ought to seek to justify tor-
ture.32  Of course he may still say that these supporters have the moral anal-
ysis wrong, and that the problem could be addressed by ensuring that 
lawyers reason through moral problems in the correct manner, and reach the 
correct result.  However, Professor Hatfield‘s appeal to ordinary moral 
analysis leaves him vulnerable to the ―oligarchy of lawyers‖ argument.33  If 
reasonable people can disagree about the morality of some action, and the 
action is permitted by law, then a lawyer who refused to assist the client 
would be depriving the client of something valuable by denying the client 
the opportunity to exercise a legal right.  This legal right may not have mor-
al value—a point made by critics of the standard conception—but it is 
something of value to the client, and thus the lawyer would appear prima 
facie to owe some obligation of justification to the client.  If the only justi-
fication offered is, ―I think what you wanted to do is morally lousy,‖ then 





  Hatfield, supra note 5, at 6. 
32
  Id. at 3.   
33
  Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617.  
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well I don‘t think it is morally lousy, and who are you to tell me about right 
and wrong?‖   
This is, in other words, the problem of moral pluralism.  Moral plural-
ism is the claim that there is a diversity of authentic goods and values with-
in even one well-lived human life, as well as a diversity of conceptions of 
the well-lived human life.34  Rawls refers to the ―burdens of judgment‖ for 
citizens living together in a community characterized by moral pluralism; 
this refers to the fact that people may be fully rational and reasoning in 
good faith, but still may disagree about matters of morality and justice.35  
There are some moral principles about which all rational agents agree—for 
example, that there are certain objectively valuable goods such as human 
life, health, and freedom from hunger, oppression, and abuse.  If these prin-
ciples are understood and agreed upon at a high level of abstraction, how-
ever, they must be specified and given application to concrete cases, and 
disagreements may arise over how these values are to be applied, and how 
conflicts among them are to be resolved.  In the context of the treatment of 
detainees, we might all agree that torture is a grave moral evil, but disagree 
about how torture is to be defined in marginal cases, how it can be differen-
tiated from aggressive but permissible questioning, whether it is justified in 
dire circumstances,36 and so on.  Fully rational people, reasoning in good 
faith, may come to different resolutions of those issues.  From the point of 
view of legal ethics, the problem is that if a lawyer were giving advice to a 
client on the basis of moral considerations, there would be no reason for the 
client to follow the lawyer‘s advice, as long as the client‘s views were with-
in the range of reasonable positions that people might take on the matter. 
What lawyers do have expertise in is the law.  In the case of the torture 
memos, the special professional knowledge of lawyers must be understood 
with respect to the law, not ordinary morality.  Lawyers are no more able 
than anyone else to say whether torture is unjustified in all circumstances, 
or whether some ―enhanced interrogation technique‖ should be deemed 
permissible in the specific context of a detainee who might have informa-
tion that could be used to save American lives.  However, lawyers are able 
to—and are required by the obligations of their role to—ascertain whether it 
is legal to use these interrogation techniques.  The important theoretical 
question for legal ethics concerns the relationship between the role-based 





  See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 112 (1999) (―On any plausible account, hu-
man life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or pri-
oritize them.‖); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 131–34 (1987); THOMAS 
NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128–41 (1979). 
35
  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 55–58 (1993). 
36
  Not surprisingly, there has been a great deal of recent scholarship on the morality of torture and 
the ticking bomb hypothetical.  See BOB BRECHER, TORTURE AND THE TICKING BOMB (2007); Henry 
Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 231 (2006) 
(link); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2005) (link).  
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lawyers, qua moral agents.  Professor Hatfield brings together the concepts 
of the rule of law and ordinary morality in his conclusion that the rule of 
law is better protected by officials who are directly responsive to the de-
mands of conscience.  I will conclude this Response by arguing briefly that 
the relationship between the values underlying the rule of law and the ethics 
of lawyering is less direct, and in fact the value of legality requires that 
lawyers exclude ordinary moral considerations when reasoning about what 
they owe to clients.37  Any social role may be more or less directly respon-
sive to the demands of morality.38  The obligations of a role are directly re-
lated to ordinary morality if role-specific duties are nothing more than ap-
applications of ordinary morality to the context of acting as a profession-
al—here, representing clients and advising them on the requirements of 
law.  In that case, ―[t]he institution and the role are eliminable‖;39 they are 
not doing any real normative work, but are merely serving as placeholders 
for a detailed specification of how ordinary moral obligations apply in these 
circumstances.  On the other hand, the relationship may be indirect, if the 
professional role is justified as part of a scheme of social institutions and 
practices that is aimed at some morally worthwhile end.  The norms internal 
to some institution or practice may preclude case-by-case reference to ordi-
nary morality if the whole point of the institution or practice is to generate 
freestanding demands.  In Rawls‘ example, the whole point of the practice 
of promising is to create obligations that are independent of what an agent 
has reason to do, all things considered, on some subsequent occasion.40  The 
normative force of a promise is not captured entirely by the reasons that ex-
ist at that subsequent occasion; rather, a promise functions by excluding 
consideration of some of the reasons that otherwise would apply to the 
promisor.  In my view, the obligations of lawyers should be understood 
along these lines.  When acting in a professional capacity, lawyers should 
not refer back to ordinary moral considerations because the whole point of 
the social institution of the legal system is to establish a basis for social so-
lidarity, coexistence, and cooperation that stands apart from the contested 
moral positions taken by individual citizens.41   
Lawyers may act on the obligations of professional roles, including 
respecting the exclusionary character of role obligations, if the institution as 
a whole is justified.  No one can deny that the rule of law and the value of 
legality may be abused by government actors intent on doing wrong.  Mere-





  As noted above, this position may be implicit in Professor Hatfield‘s criticism of John Yoo and 
others, for having acted on their own moral beliefs that torture is permissible in certain circumstances. 
38
  For a valuable discussion of this concept, see DARE, supra note 14, at 29–58, in Chapter 3, ―The 
Idea of Role-Obligation.‖ 
39
  Id. at 36.   
40
  John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (link). 
41
  The full argument for this position is in W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 
(forthcoming 2010). 
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based on Nazi laws or the Jim Crow regime in the American South.  But 
these examples only show that the form of lawful government can be 
abused, not that the moral attractiveness of the role of lawyer is not con-
nected with the goods enabled by the social institution of a legal system.  
As Joseph Raz observes, a good knife must be, among other things, a sharp 
knife, but the quality of sharpness does not prevent a knife from being used 
for wrongful ends.42  My argument here is that the rule of law has certain 
good-making properties associated with it.  These include the capacity of a 
legal system to safeguard against the abuse of power and to enable people 
to give a justification for their actions, which refers to considerations 
adopted by using tolerably fair procedures, in the name of the community as 
a whole.  To the extent a lawyer‘s actions further or are required by these 
institutional ends, they partake in the good of the institution.  The institu-
tional end to which lawyers are particularly committed is the value of le-
gality.43  This makes out a justification for the lawyer‘s actions, as against 
the demands of ordinary morality, and also explains why lawyers should 
not act directly on what they take to be the demands of ordinary morality.  
Legality requires the exclusion of morality.  Thus, the OLC lawyers, ironi-
cally, can be criticized in ethical terms for trying to do the right thing, in re-
sponse to what they took to be the demands of morality. 
Professor Hatfield cites my 2008 Wickwire Lecture at Dalhousie Law 
School, in which I argued that the torture memos were a failure of legal 
craft.44  Professor Hatfield suggests that the notion of craft does not con-
strain the range of legal advice that could be offered: ―To diagnose the 
problem as one of poor craftsmanship suggests that, among all the possible 
legal memoranda, one memorandum could perhaps be crafted to reach the 
same conclusions in a defensible manner.  It is just not this one.‖45  There 
would be a difficult moral issue presented if the applicable domestic and in-
ternational law really did permit torture in some circumstances.  Although a 
lawyer is permitted to refer to ―moral, economic, social[,] and political fac-
tors‖ when advising a client,46 this is a permission only, not a duty, and a 
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if ―the client insists upon 
taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant . . . .‖47  Of course, with-
drawal is a drastic remedy—particularly when the client is also the employ-
er of the lawyer.  If it is possible to imagine a democratic society, 
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legally permissible in some circumstances,48 the standard conception of le-
gal ethics would put real pressure on lawyers as moral agents.  The justifi-
cation given above, along the lines suggested by John Rawls and Tim Dare, 
still holds in that hypothetical situation.  The law provides citizens with ―a 
sound and stable framework for their interactions with one another,‖49 
which necessarily is based on procedural norms that can be endorsed by cit-
izens regardless of substantive disagreements they may have with one 
another.  In most cases the role-based obligations of lawyers, which flow 
from the values of legality, mutual respect, and human dignity, supersede 
what would otherwise be the moral obligations of non-lawyers.  Perhaps the 
torture hypothetical would be a limiting case for this conception of role mo-
rality. 
However, the whole point of a craft is that it deems certain acts incon-
sistent with its own internal, regulative standards.  We refer to craft norms 
when we judge a piece of music uninspiring, a poem banal, a wine flabby, 
an athlete graceless, or an argument unpersuasive.  While there may be dis-
agreements among participants, the existence of disagreement does not 
mean that evaluations within the domain of a craft are subjective or arbi-
trary.  I have a delightful book that collects vituperative critical reactions to 
pieces by composers like Beethoven, Wagner, and Stravinsky.50  Although 
it is fun to read these reviews and feel superior to critics who failed to grasp 
the genius of someone like Schubert, it is also apparent that these negative 
judgments are not arbitrary.  Rather, they are widely shared, but reflect a 
too-narrow definition of the relevant craft, one that was expanded by the 
contributions of forward-thinking practitioners.  Craft conceptions of legal 
ethics have a way of coming off as conservative, when in fact a vibrant craft 
contains resources for self-criticism, change, and renewal.  The craft of mu-
sic includes not only the critics who said a cat walking down a piano key-
board could produce better music than Schönberg,51 but also Schönberg 
himself, who redefined the idea of an admirable piece of music.  Similarly, 
the craft of ―doing law‖ (to make use of Lon Fuller‘s way of looking at 
things) includes critiques by lawyers, judges, and scholars who are dissatis-
fied with the status quo.  Naturally, John Yoo sees himself as such a for-
ward-thinking critic.  In his view, the September 11 attacks changed 
everything, and the law has to adapt to this new threat; to continue to re-
spect outdated legal regimes, such as the Geneva Conventions, is to make a 
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tances.52  Professor Hatfield is therefore concerned that there is some con-
ceivable memo—prescient in the manner of Judge Cardozo‘s MacPherson 
opinion or revolutionary in the manner of the decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education—that would justify the torture of detainees.   
It is interesting that Professor Hatfield includes a critique of legal edu-
cation, because I have often thought that law school is excessively oriented 
around paradigm-shifting moments like Brown, or great cases like Mac-
Pherson that mark watersheds in the evolution of legal doctrine.  Most of 
the law does not work like this, however, and one of the things that surpris-
es many recent graduates is how well settled the law often is.  Granted, well 
settled law can sometimes change, as it did in the transition from Plessy to 
Brown or from the privity rule to MacPherson.  But this change seldom 
happens all at once, and careful lawyers can see indications of a developing 
trend in the law.53  Legal reasoning is not deductive, but that does not mean 
it does not have a structure, an overall sense and purpose, an ―immanent ra-
tionality.‖54  The reasoning in the OLC memos respects the superficial ma-
nifestations of legality—the page numbering and citation formats that 
Professor Hatfield refers to—but betrays no concern for the deeper structure 
of legal reasoning.  Borrowing the definition of severe pain from a Medi-
care reimbursement statute (in which ―severe pain‖ was used, among other 
indicia, as criteria for defining an emergency) is an obvious example.  That 
is almost a parody of textualism, in which words alone are considered, hav-
ing no regard for the context of their usage.  Another example is the failure 
to recognize the sense and purpose of the Geneva Conventions.  Despite the 
reliance on the category of ―unlawful combatants,‖ the denial of prisoner-
of-war status to al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees does not throw these persons 
outside the protection of international humanitarian law altogether.  The 
whole point of the Geneva scheme is to create a baseline level of mandatory 
humane treatment for everyone affected by war, with increasing protections 
afforded to certain classes of persons, such as prisoners of war.55  If a law-
yer‘s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions were that a detainee is en-
titled to no human rights at all, that interpretation would be a failure of 
craft, for its refusal to consider a basic principle of legal interpretation. 
Legal ethics as craft should be identified with some kind of pedantic 
concern with formalities.  The obligation of fidelity to law is quite demand-
ing.  Lawyers must respect, interpret in good faith, and maintain in good 
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common society.  The value of legality reflects more than a mere fetish for 
legal forms.  The normative attractiveness of law depends on its capacity to 
reflect our mutual respect and solidarity.  As Lon Fuller puts it, ―our forma-
lized interactions with others are accompanied by certain interlocking ex-
pectations.‖56  One of these expectations is that the law will be interpreted in 
good faith, with an eye toward recovering the substantive meaning of a sta-
tute, treaty, or line of cases.  Violating this expectation is the essence of the 
unethical conduct of lawyers like Yoo and Bybee.  In the absence of a 
commitment to honoring the expectations of citizens that laws will be inter-
preted in good faith, lawyers cannot be regarded as doing anything of moral 
value qua lawyers.  Instead, they become merely government officials seek-
ing to exercise unrestrained power, and that is antithetical to the rule of law.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are many virtues of government.  Government actors and institu-
tions can be praised, for example, for their energy, vigor, efficiency, res-
ponsiveness, creativity, fairness, incorruptibility, and compassion.  One of 
the virtues of government is legality.  Government lawyers are specifically 
concerned with this virtue of government, and not others.  That is what it 
means to be a lawyer and not, say, a pollster, political adviser, economist, 
foreign-affairs specialist, or any other kind of expert whose role is defined 
with reference to other virtues of government.  If an executive branch offi-
cial decides that, all things considered, it is better to act like Jack Bauer in 
―24‖ than to respect the obligations of the law, that is a decision he or she 
may make.57  This decision carries risks, of course—the official may subse-
quently be prosecuted for war crimes, or at least may be judged in the court 
of public opinion to have acted wrongly.  The important feature of govern-
ment lawyering is that the obligations of lawyers are not to be understood 
with reference to this all-things-considered standpoint.  Lawyers are legal 
advisers, not political or moral consultants.  The good-making qualities of 
their role are related to the virtue of legality, not to other virtues of govern-
ment.  The right way to criticize John Yoo, Jay Bybee, Stephen Bradbury, 
and other lawyers in the Bush OLC is with reference to the value of legali-
ty.  In these terms, their advice was an unmitigated fiasco.  Professor Hat-
field is correct to call this an ethical disaster, but our response should be to 
insist that lawyers pay more attention to the internal norms of the good la-
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